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The "$6.6bn missing" question: DFI funds at CPA dissolution and DoD's undocumented spending (SIGIR from 2010 to 2012)

In July 2010 SIGIR found that weaknesses in the US Department of Defense's controls left it unable to properly account for $8.7bn of $9.1bn in DFI funds it received, and that DoD could not document how it spent $2.6bn. In 2011 SIGIR referred to $6.6bn that "allegedly" remained unaccounted for; press reports called it possibly the largest theft in US history, which Inspector General Stuart Bowen publicly corrected, saying no one had said the money was stolen. SIGIR 12-001 (October 2011) later found the CPA had transferred control of almost all of the $6.6bn to the Central Bank of Iraq, and SIGIR 12-008 (January 2012) found DoD could not account for about two-thirds of the about $3bn of those funds it subsequently used.

Period
From June 2004 to January 2012
Sector
Reconstruction and donor fundsDFI accounting after CPA dissolution
Kind of case
Audit finding
Jurisdiction
More than one jurisdiction

How the money moved, according to the sources

This account is the one given by the sources listed on this page. It is not the finding of a court.

After the CPA closed, DFI money was held in accounts (FRBNY sub-account and palace vault) from which DoD paid CPA-era contracts; DoD did not open the required Treasury accounts or keep supporting invoices, so payments cannot be matched to deliverables. The problem documented is missing documentation, not proven theft.

What happened

Audit findings; no recovery or prosecution specifically tied to the undocumented DoD payments is on record. The "$6.6bn stolen" framing is not supported by SIGIR's own later reports.

Open questions

  • What happened to the about $2bn of post-CPA payments DoD could not document?
  • Did the Government of Iraq formally claim reimbursement from the US for undocumented DFI spending (reports in 2011 suggested parliamentary demands)?

People and companies

The table lists everyone this case names, with their legal status on the date shown. A status in this case does not carry over to any other case, and an accusation is not a conviction. How to read the status.
People and companies
NameRole in the caseLegal statusDetailAs of
Stuart W. Bowen Jr.
ستيوارت بوين
Special Inspector General for Iraq ReconstructionNot charged as of the date of writingClarified in June 2011 that no one had said the money was stolen.25 September 2026

Sources

These are the documents on which this case rests. Each quote is given in the language of the document.
  1. SIGIR (via GovInfo)27 July 2010Audit reportTier A

    SIGIR 10-020: Development Fund for Iraq: Department of Defense Needs To Improve Financial and Management Controls

    Weaknesses in DoD’s financial and management controls left it unable to properly account for $8.7 billion of the $9.1 billion in DFI funds it received for reconstruction activities in Iraq.
    DoD could not provide documentation to substantiate how it spent $2.6 billion.
    OriginalSHA-256 062805fd951c
  2. SIGIR (via GovInfo)27 January 2012Audit reportTier A

    SIGIR 12-008: Development Fund for Iraq: The Department of Defense Cannot Fully Account for the Funds It Used After the CPA Dissolved

    DoD cannot account for about two-thirds of the approximately $3 billion in DFI funds made available to it by the GOI
    the CPA Administrator transferred full and legal control over almost all of the $6.6 billion remaining in DFI funds to the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI).
    OriginalSHA-256 ab082aa85c9c
  3. Government Executive14 June 2011Press reportTier D

    Auditor clarifies comment about missing cash in Iraq

    no one has said the money was stolen
    Original